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Abstract

Tn a recent pi ece for the Asbury Theological Journal , Na than Crawford
has attempted to put current understandings of em ergent phen o m ena within
the n euroscien ces in conver sa tion with Christian soteriology; in particular,
Crawford has sought to link up themes found in emergence with di stinctively
\'Vesleyan pers pect ive s on san cti fication. Tn thi s article, T o ffer so me
refl ection s on th eo log ical me thodol ogy in lig ht of Crawford's analysis, and
I identify som e need ed clarifications of K enneth J Collins's model o f John
Wesley's soteriology. In the latter half of the piece, I present a critical analysis
of the issue of monergism and synergism in Wesley's understanding of grace.
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I. Scientific Emergentism and Theological Methodology
In a recent pi ece in the Asbury Theologicalfotlrnal, Nathan Crawforu has
attempted to put current und erstandings of emerge nt ph enomena within
th e neurosciences in conversation with Christian so teri ology; in parti cula r,
Crawford has sought to link up themes found in emergence with distinctively
Wes leyan perspectives on sanctification. He defines emergence as "the theory
that cosmic evoluti o n repeatedly includ es unpredictable, irreducibl e, and
novel appearances."1 According to Crawford, theology can use the " kind
of thinking" employed in the neurosciences to enrich its articulatio n o f
doctrin al matters, in this case the doctrin e of enrjre sanctification.' Crawforu
goes on to offer a constru ctive proposal that he beli eves sheds light o n the
debate between Kenneth]. Collins and Randy Maddox, proponents o f the
two main competing interpretations of John Wesley's theology. Toward the
end of hi s piece, Crawford argues that if the creation and evolution of
human p ersons have b een shown to be emergent ph eno mena, we can
speculate that salvation and sanctification are emergent phenom ena as well.;
There is much to commend a meth odo logy that seeks to illustrate
coherence between the work of God in creation and the work of Gou in
salva ti on. Th e achievements of scien ce in term s of improv ing our
und erstanding of the material world can illuminate and inform the tas k of
soteriology, which is the branch of Christian theology that see ks to give a
logica l account of the natur e o f human sa lvation. Likewise, o ur
unders tanding of how God works in salvation can shed light on Go d's
creating and sustaining work in the natural world. All truth is God's truth,
so we sho uld expect general revelation and special revelation to be not only
logically consistent, but also mutually reflective of one another. T he Christian
worldview has the wh erewithal to provide such a unified and integrated
vision of reality. So, for instance, science can tell us much about the makeup
o f the human person in terms of the brain and neuroscience, which we ca n
th en correlate with Chri stian th eological anthropology.4
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind the limitations and potential
pi tfall s o f such a methodology, some of whi ch Crawford himself is exp li citly
aware" To begin, we cannot assum e that God's work in crea ti on wi ll always
have a direct or complete parallel with the Lord's work in salvation. While
some such parallel s may exist between the two spheres, we need to possess
more than m ere ly sugges ti ve evidenc e b ased on loo se ly analogous
relati onships be fore we can make responsibl e ex trapol ation s. Moreover, rhe
Christian Scriptures, interpreted in the conrext of the church, conta in the
cl eares t and most complete revelation of Gou's savi ng activity in the world,
and hence they should serve as our pree minent source for soteriological
truth. This should have a sigruficant impact on our theological methodo logy.
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Because our independent knowledge of soteriological truth through general
revelation is often spotty, limited, and unclear, we should start with God's
complete revelation in Scripture and work from there. Unless we have strong
evidence from nature for a proposition
to Joteriofogy-evidence that is
stronger than the evidence we possess for a logically incompatible
interpretation of Scripture-it is more epistemically and theologically sound
to follow the light of God's special revelation regarding that proposition 6
Our methodology should differ substantially if we are dealing with
scientific propositions-propositions about the natural world. In what I see
as the classical Wesleyan view on the role of Scripture, the Bible does not
purport to speak authorit.'ltively on the intricacies of the processes of nature.
Questions about such topics are best posed and answered within the realm
of the physical sciences'" This is not to say that the Bible has nothing to say
about the nature of physical entities, but its primary purpose is to speak on
matters of salvation and our relationship to God. l'\evertheless, it would
also be a mistake to view science and theology as occupying utterly
disconnected epistemic spheres, "never the two shaLl meet." As Alvin
Plantinga has pointed out, belief that a divine creator is the ultimate cause
of nature will (rightly) affect our evaluation of the plausibility of various
scientific hypotheses, even if that creator never interferes directly in the
world beyond the initial creation ,'
In addition to these methodological considerations, to which Crawford
may well be amenable, many would take issue with his seeming view that all
of God's work in creation from the Big Bang onward can be subsumed
under a gradualistic, process-oriented paradigm via evolution.' He
importantly leaves out the Big Bang itself-God's creation of the world out
of nothing (creatio ex nihilo)-which surely mu st be seen as a non-gradual,
ins tantaneous act; indeed it is a miracle. ' °At the moment of the Big Bang,
the natural universe in its nascent form comes into being out of nothing
with all of the necessary prerequisites for life as the result of the sheer free
will of God. Wesley pointed to creation and the giving of life as a species
of the free grace of God, tl1e sovereign work of God alone."
But beyond this, insisting that all of God's creative activity after the Big
Bang falls under emergent or evolutionary labels seems to overshoot the

scientific evidence. Are we certain that evolution or emergent phenomena
can explain all complexity in nature, including the origin of life from non life? It seems to me that this would be to go beyond currently available
scientific evidence, even if all biological complexity can be explained via
natural, Darwinian evolution (Darwinism can begin only when there is life) .
It is possible that God has performed miracles in the course of natural
history that disrupt any emergent relationship between new phenomena
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and old ph eno mena. Because we lack a compreh en sive und erstanding of
natural hi story, we should not assume that a comprehensive evo luti onary
or em ergent paradigm can explain eve rything in th e natural worlu .'2

II. Competing Interpretations of Wesley Clarified
In hi s p iece, Crawford brie fl y summari zes bo th Co lli ns's and Maddox's
interpre tations of Wesley's theology before presenting his own constru ctive
proposa l. Crawford concedes that hi s cliscussion is "slightly arbitrary" and
that " the two are much mo n: nuanced" than he has shown.'.; One certainly
cannot expec t Crawford to address each and every subtlety in these two
competing realLngs of Wesley, but in this case Crawford's lack of nuance
resu lts in a mi srepresentation of Collins's view. While Crawford uoes note
that the "instantaneo us" (Collins's) anu the " process" (Maudox's) views, as
he terms them, do not mutually excl ud e o ne another, he fa il s to illustra te
auequately the collJimclive nature of Collins's view of Wesley's understanuing
o f sanctification that in corp orates both process and crisis
The source of the confusion, I think, li es in C rawford 's frelju ent
conflation of the process of sa nctification with entire sa nctificati o n, a
distinction that is critical in unders tanding Co llins's view on these matters.
I n his pubLshed work, Collins has argued for a process of sanctification
that begins after the crisis of the new birth anu in w hich the tempe rs o f the
heart are gradually transformed and made holy by God's grace.' s The process
of sa nctifi cation is to be clistinguished from entire sanctification, which in
ColLns's reading o f Wesley is a second, di sti nct work of grace that issues in
a ljuali tative change fro m an impure heart to a fu lly pure heart. In one
moment the heart is impure, and in the next it is pure by the actualization
of entirely sanctifying grace. 1(, Once th e clistin ctio n betwee n the process of
sanctification and entire sanc tiflcation is maue clear, one can see that Co llins
has a place in his interpretation for gradual growth by degree in sa nctifl' ing
gr ace. But w herea s M addox tend s to focus o n th e proc ess -o ri ented
climensions of \Ves ley's thought in a seemingly exclusive way, Colli ns presents
an o,.do Ja/uliJ that incorporates both process anu cris is elements o f \Ves ln's
soteriology.
It is worth noting two more aspects of Crawford 's prese nta tion that
need some tweaking. Firstly, he reports th at Collin s separates th e twofold
problem of sin into the "o urwaru appearance" of sin and "the prob lem of
original, inbred sin." In point of fact, Collins, following Wesley, distinguish es
between tlcllla/sin, pertaining to deliberate acts that go against God's cl ea rl y
revealed will ("will ful tran sgression of a known law of God "), anu
or iI/bred sin, pertaining to sin as a state in the form of unho ly tempers and
dispositions. 17 The di stincti on between outward and inward sin is a different
matter. To illustrate the diffe rence, one can co mmi t actua l sin , on this
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definition, even if it has no outward manifestation whatsoever. For instance,
one may surrend er to th e intention to commit adultery without ever hav ing
th e opportuni ry to commit the act outwardly. Inbred sin, alternatively, can
manifes t itself in outward behavior, as when our partly well-intentioned
actions are mixed with sinful motives. '"
Secondl y, Crawford seems to impute the v iew that original sin is a
" juridical punishment upon all of humanity for the sin of Adam" to Collins,
though thi s view is repudiated b y both Collins and Maddox." Bo th
in terpreters highlight Wesley's growing opposition to tll e notion of original!
inherited guilt, which is reflected in Wesley's work in two ways: first, Wesley
eventually argued that any guilt inherited from Adam is cancelled at birth
by the atoning work of Christ. 20 Second, Wesley omitted the allusion to
inherited guilt in the Ninth Article of the Anglican Thirty-nine Articles when
he pruncu and reformulateu them for th e Methodists in Am erica. Both
interpreters agree that the eviu ence from Wesley's works indicates that he
was far more comfortable speaking about original sin in terms of inherited
corruption rather than inherited gui/I. 21

III. A Fresh Look at Wesleyan Grace
Many of the church's ho ttest theological controversies have been over
the role of divine grace in human salvation. It comes as no surprise then
that some of the most central debates in Wesley stuuies are over the nature
of divine grace and its relationship to the human will. On the one hand,
Collins has argued for an overarching distinction between "co-operant grace"
and " free grace." \'Vhen he spea ks of co-operant grace, Collins is lifting up
threads of Wesley's thought that involve divine-human cooperation, what
is commonly called synergism. With co-operant grace, God takes the
initiative, bur human beings must wo rk as well. By free grace, Collins is
referring to those points in Wesley's ordo .ra/utir (order of salvation) in which
God works "alone" apart from all human working, what is commonly termed
monergism 22 He sees free grace as a departure from clivine-human synergism
in Wesley's thought. Collins seeks to hold these two conceptions of Wesleyan
grace in a conjunctive balance. On hi s interpretation of Wesley's though t,
God "works alone" in the ordo .ra/uti.r (via free grace) in prevenient grace,
justification / regeneration, and entire sanctification. 23
On the other hand , Maddox id entifies "responsible grace" as the
overarching conception of grace in Wesley's theology. Maddox's responsible
grace is essentially identical to Collins's co-operant grace. It highlights the
necess iry of God's gracious, empowering initiative, wlule afftrming that
human persons must also work with this grace in a divine-human synergism.24
Collins wants to affirm Maddox's insights, but he argues that a failure to
incorporate free grace into o ne's overall view o f grace results in a distorted,
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semi -Pelagian read ing of Wesley's theology that neglects Wesley's wellworked them e of the work of God alolle2 ' But alth ough Maddox does no t
give the monergistic work of God a name or make it a central feature in hi s
hi storical and constructive account of \'\fesley's th eology, he nevertheless
tlnds mo nergis m in We sley's theo logy in terms of God's creating and
sus taining activity in th e worJd. 2G Co llin s, too, find s th e theme of mon ergism
in Wesley's understanding of creation2?
Befo re we evaluate th ese two reigning conceptions of Wes leya n grace,
we need to take a short excursus in phi losophical/systematic theology in
order to get a tlrm grasp o n the concept of monergism. As a theologica l
term, " mon ergism" is generally defined as entailing the work of God alone
to the excl usion o f all human working or activ ity. \'\fh ether God is working
alone in a uni lateral se nse that does not entail determinism, or whether the
Lord is working alone in a deter ministic/ irresistible2K sen se, the basic id ea
is that the Lord is the 01lly ca usal actor in any m oment of monergistic grace
to the exclusion of all human working, as the term itself suggests. '"
Monergism is typically seen as contrasting with synergism , which invo lves
both divin e and human work- divine/human cooperation.
It seems clear from the evidence marshaled by Coll ins and Maddox that
John Wesley did develop both synergistic and monergistic conceptions of
grace. 311 The con junction of divine working alld human working is not
suftl cient to capture the totality of Wesley's thought on grace; one needs an
even larger conjunction involvi ng both divine-human cooperation and the
work of God alone. " As we have already noted, Wesley explicitly states
that God works utterly alone in the creation of the world. In ad di tion to
this, Wes ley sees God as working unilaterally in many of th e Lord's
provid enti al acts, including some that involve human bei ngs and their
salvation. For instance, as \'\fesley notes, God's sove re ign power alo ne
establi shes the following decree: " H e that believeth shall be saved: he that
believeth n ot shall be damned.""
Moreover, as Collins rightly notes, a logical impli cation o f Wesley's views
o n original sin and total depravi ty is that prevenient g race (in Outler's
" narrow sense," which is the more common usage in Wesley) must also be
understood as a spec ies of genuin e monergism in terms of re sto ring four
key features of human personali ty in re sponse to the fall: a basic kn owledge
of the attributes of God, a partial re-inscription o f the moral law, conscience,
and a measure of free will. 33 Apart from God's preveni ent grace, we would
be a mass of sin, utterly unable to respond to God either positively or
negatively, for we would lack the essential features suftlci ent for personhood.
Collins is explicit that God's work is " irresistibl e" at this point. 1• This might
be something of a mi snomer, as on Wesley's view th ere is no person in
place capable of res isting God's grace apart from thi s restoring preveni ent
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grace due to the severe effects of the Fal!." Nevertheless, God's work in
the initial restoring act of prevenient grace is at least unilateral in that God
is the only one working. Indeed, even the ongoing prevenient overtures of
God's grace in addition to this initial restoring activity can be characterized
rightly as monergism insofar as they continue to occur apart from our
positive response (and in the face of our negative response), which reveals
the unilateral, though non-deterministic, nature of ongoing prevenient
g race.'" Any positive response to grace depends upon God's ongoing
bestowal of prevenient grace.37 So both initial, restoring prevenient grace
an d ongoing prevenien t grace are examples of genuin e monergism, for
God works alon e in both instances.
Does Wesley develop a monergistic understanding of ju stification /
regeneration and entire sanctification? I think the answer to this is in one
sense "yes" and another sense " no." In order to approach this particular
issue, we first need to note that Collins seems to use the language of
"monergism" and "the work of God alone" (interchangeably) to refer to
two somewhat different phenomena in his theological interpretation of
Wesley. On the one hand , he uses it to refer to the unilateral or irresistible /
determini stic work of God that does not involve or entail any human
re sponse whatsoever, such as the Lord's work in prevenient grace. 1S On the
o th er hand, he uses it to refer to justification/ regeneration and entire
sanctification, which he holds are resistible works of God that require the
necessary condition of our free reception 3 9 This dual-usage can also be seen
in the fact that Collins uses his umbrella term for the monergistic work o f
God, " free grace," to cover God's conditional work in ju stification/
regeneration and entire sanctification, as well as the unilateral or irresistible/
deterministic work of God in prevenient grace 4 0
This ambiguity in Collins's terminology is likely a reflection of Wesley'S
own slightly ambiguous use of thi s language, which is actually an indirect
tes tament to Collins's faitllfulness to t11e so urce material.'" Wesley him self
applies monergistic language both to th e unilateral or irres istible/
deterministic work of God in creation, providence, and prevenient grace,
which we have already seen, and to the resistible and conditional work of
God in justification /regenerati o n and entire sanctification, An exampl e of
the latter usage can be found in Predestinatjon Calmly Considered, in which
\,(!esley asserts, " It is tl,e work of God alone to justify, to sanctify, and to
glorify; which three comprehend the whole of salvation."" Furthermore,
in addition to speaking of the unilateral or irresistible/ deterministic work
of God in creation as a species of "free grace," Wesley also speaks of
God's resistible and conditional work in conversion as "free" as well: "One
may freely give you a sum of money, on the condition you stretch out your
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hand to receive it. It is therefore no contradiction to sa)" 'We are justifi ed
frecly by grace, and yet upon certain ter ms and conditions."'4,;
It is straightforwardly clear how God's work in crcation, providence,

and prevenient grace can be accurately described as monergism in Wesle\es
thought: there are no conditions for human beings to meet at such junctures,
so it clear that God works utterly alone at such moments, whe ther this is
understood in a unilateral or an irresistible/deterministic sense. What is
less clear is how God's work in justi fica tio n / regenera tion and entire
sanctification can be accurately d escribed as monergism in light of both
Wesley's and Co llins 's affirmation that aspirants of these graces must
perform a free' 4 act of consent in order to receive them. Can this apparent
contradiction be resolved? Can we make se nse of monergism at these
moments of grace, or must Wesley be interpreted as a synergist with respect
to Justification / regeneration and entire sanctification for the sa ke of logical
consistency?
Collins describes the condition of consent required to receive these graces
as an ",,!tJ/oJtpassive" act of surrend er and faith. 45 He wam s to avoid calling
this surrender a "wo rk,"'" but it seems clear that insofar as one is not totally
passive when one exercises such an act of faith, one is engaged in some
degree of activity, however minimal. Such an almost passive act is still an
act, which is to say that it is a movemem or operation of the wi ll that
requires some measure of causal exertion by the agent. Because thi s ac t is
enabl ed by God's ongoing prevenient grace, we are talking about di\'inehuman cooperation here; in other words, we are still in the synergistic model
at this point.
This does not, however, complete the piCl"me of what happens in th ese
crucial moments of grace. While we indeed do someth ing even in an almost
passive act of faith, what exac tl y is it that we do? If we understand this act
of faith as leading to a state of "openness" before God in Weslev's theology,
as Collins does''', it is plausible that the goal of such an act is to ente r into
a state of truly total passivity before God's grace. Collins seems to ex press
a worry that total passivity before God's grace wou ld rule out genuine human
fr eedom and entail determinism, which is w hy he is careful to describe the
act of faith in crucial moments of grace as being "almost" passive 4 ' While
thi s concern is understandable, it seems clear to m e that so long as Cod
docs not causaliy determine us to choose something in such moments, and
so long as an agent freely chooses to enter into a state of total passivitl'
before God's grace, there is nothing incompatible between lotal pa>s i\'il)'
and stanclard accounts of libertarian freeclom and hum an "gencI', \'(Ih3"
this means, interestingly enough, is that monergism does not necessari h'
entail determinism even when it comes to our positi ve responses to Cod.
In order to get an idea of what such an act of surrender would look lik e,
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consider the analogy of a pa tien t submitting to an inhere ntly painful
operation by a medical professional. The natural inclination of th e patient
is to resist th e doctor's work altogether because of the unavoidable pain
invo lved in th e procedure. Resistance represents activity of the will,
regardless o f how considerabl e or slight that activity is. Now imagine that
this operation requires the patient to lie fl at and idle on a table. If the
patient choo ses to submit to the operation, she essen tially chooses to cease
resisting and enter into a state of complete and utter inactivity of the will.
Although it takes an act of the w ill to enter into snch a state, the state itse lf
represents total passivity and a complete lack of human effort and willings.
T h e o nl y person working after such a surrend e r is the doctor who is
performing the operation.
If we app ly the sa me kind of sequ ential thinking to justi fi cation /
regene ratio n and entire sanctifi catio n, we can see the subtle way in which
synergism gives way to m onergism at these crucial operation s of grace. By
freel y and coope ratively relaxing ourse lves into the grace of God through
an almost passive act of faith , we ente r into a state of total passivity before
God's grace. In this ac t, we simply cease giving into our natural inclination
to resist the grace of God. Such an act of faith should be understood as a
complete relincluishment of all exerti on and activity, as one surrenders to
an operation or to sleep:" This synergis tic act of surrender, which is enab led
by the ongoing prevenient grace of God, gives way to genuine m onergism
once human activity completely ceases and th e Lord alone is at work.
W hil e justification/ regenerati on and entire sanctification are different
fro m o ther instances o f monergism in Wesley's theology in that they require
a synergistic work o f faith as a necessary condition to receive these graces,
once thi s condition is met we indeed break through to genuine monergism
at these soteriol ogical points.'" By willing to enter into a state of non-willing,
we choose a state of co mpl etely pass ive openness before God as the Lord
alone works unilaterally. \'Ve need not first "be or do thus or thu s," as Wesley
puts it, in terms of contributing to God's work beyond presenting ourselves
to God so that the Most High can acco mpli sh it. S! God is the one and on ly
causal ac tor in such moments. Moreover, the powerful works of g race
wrought by God at the soteriological points of justification/regeneration
and entire sanctification are radically disproportionate to the paltry work
we do to receive them, and far more crucial than the gradual growth in
grace that ta kes place before and after these moments. "
In the course of this ana lysis, I have to uched upo n two related iss ues
that must nevertheless b e kept distinct in order for fru it ful dialogue on
\'Vesleyan grace to co ntinue to take place. T h e fir st is the matter of
inte rpretation: What did Wesley mean? W hat reconstruction reflects his
most mature theological reflection? The seco nd is the question of logical
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consistency and theo logical soundness: Was Wes ley logically co nsistent in
hi s variou s aftirmation s? Docs he ever equivocate over certain terms e ll j
have not developed a fully-orbed model of Wesley's theology fit to compete
with that of Collins and Maddox in thi s short paper. In stead, I have foc used
my analysis of Wesleyan grace on the iss ue of monergism and synergism in
Wes ley's th eology of grace. I affirm with Maddox and Collins that in Wes ley's
thinking, God di spla ys genuine monergism in the Lord 's crea ting an d
sustaining activity in the world. Furthermore, I agree wid1 Collins that Wesley
sees God as working alone in the work of prevenient grace. J also have
noted that \'(Ies ley understand s God to work monergistica ll y in certa in
provid ential decrees.
When it comes to justification / regeneration and entire sanctifica ti on, I
believe Collins is on the right track in identifying th ese works of g race as
in stances of monergism in Wes ley's thought.'" T here is no do ubt that Wesley
uses the language o f "the work of God alo ne" to characterize th ese
soteri ological mom ents. I have presented so me fu rther cl arifi cations and
distinctions that can help us see that there is an irreducibl e element of
synergism involved in almost passively receiving these graces. T hi s synergism
gives way to monergism as the will chooses to drain itself of all activity and
effectively turn itself o ff before the g race of God." It does see m that
genuine monergism logicall y entail s total passivity on the part of the agent
at these points, for God must be the sole causal actor in order to be the
only one working. This does not, however, imply or entail determini sm at
these points. Moreover, it should be obvious that the cooperation entailed
by almost passive acts of surrender is radically different fro m the synergism
involved in o ur highly active works of mercy and piety, as we are talking
about an almost pass ive act of surrender that resu lts in a state of total
passivity. \X/e might employ a di stinction between J1leak and J/rong synergism
to make th e difference cl ear.;(·
T hope that the brief refl ections offered in this paper can prompt fresh and
exciting refl ec tion on the topics of methodology and grace in Wes leyan theology.
Examining our methodology of theology teq uires us to dig deepl y in order to
un cover our most ba sic philosophi ca l and theo logical presuppositiuns about th e

nature of knowledge, reve lati on, and God. The more we exa min e these
presuppositi ons, th e berter our theo logica l thinking will be. And when wc ana lyzc
grace, we are analyzing the work of God in bringing people to salvation, a tas k that
is as in1po rtant as it is chal.lenging. Whenever we enter in to either conversa tion , we
mu st be sure to represent o ur di alogue partners accuTately so that fruitfu l and
il lum inating in terac tion can take place.57
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necessary to explain the complex nature o f the will, sin , and sin's effects on our
relationship with God. Willfulness, for instance, can come in degrees, from the
most fully flagrant act to the mos t passive and subtle consent of the will. There are
many actions that can be partly meant for good and partly meant for ev il. Inbred
sin (distinct from temptation) invariabl y results in actual/willful sin in some measure,
the willfulness of which can come in degrees. The new birth may subdue o ur sinful
nature, but insofar as we are still sinful, it will find expression in o ur everyday lives
in some measure until we are perfected in love. It is therefore appropriate to speak
of ongoing forgiveness in the Christian walk.
18
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'I Collins, The Tbeology of John West')', 64.
" Ibid., 12- 13.
23

Ibid ., 162; 292-293.

" Maddox, 86-87
" Collins, 204.
" , Maddox, 55.
" Co llins 27-28 .
2k

D e termini sm is the view that an agent's actio ns are de termin ed by causall y

sufficient pri or causcs o utsid e of the agen t's conrrol. 'r n say grace is irresistible in a
theological context usually mea ns that such grace causa ll y determi nes th e choice (s)
of th e will, whether prox imately o r remotely. God cl earl y work s monergisti ca ll y
wh en Hi s work alone is ca usally suffi cient to determine hu man choice(s) .

"J C f. " P elagia n ism: A Mo nerg is t M o d e l of Rede mp tio n ," h trp :/ /
eva ngelicalarmi ni ans.org/ glynn. Pelagian ism.f\ -Monergis t - tv! oJe l-of- Red emp tion
(altho ugh J d o thin k Arminiaism aLlows for monergism beyond initiati ng p revenie nt
grace); "A Simple E xpla nati o n of Mo nergism," h ttp:/ / www.rno nergism. curn /
tb erbreshold /a rticles/onsire/ rno nergisrn _sim plc.h tml; and "Monergism," hllp:/ /
dicrio nary.reference.com/browse/monergism. We will sec that C od ca n be the " (lil ly
effici en t cause" of jus ti fica tion / regeneratio n and e ntire sa nc ti fication w ith o u l
ove rriding genuine hum an freedo m, so lo ng as G-od does not causa ll y deter m ine
our choices in such m Oll1e nt s, and so lo ng as human be ings are free to ca use

th emselves to enter into a state of total inactivi ty of the will. I n other word s, G od
ca ll work alone in a real se nse witho ut wo rking determi nisticall y, wh ich ma y come
as a surprise to some Ca lvi ni sts.

'" ColLins, 155- 164; Maddox 91-93.
II

Collins, 164- / 65.

" " Predes tin ation Calmly Considered," Letlm, EJS{{),s, Dialogs (/1Ir1ArlrlresJeJ, 10:235.
:n 1n my own view (distin c t from \Xlcsley's), 1 bel ieve it is more accurate to
speak of God 's p revenient grace IIpholriing or presen';lIg these features of humiln
perso nhood. In other words, I do not believe the fi rst sin o f the Fall caused humanir),
to plunge immed iately into total depravity, at whi ch point God needed to reJ/{)re th e

ba sic fea tures o f pe rson hood. Rather, I bel ieve that C o d's grace swooped in

immediately (and unilaterally) at Lhe Fall, checki ng the downward spiral of sin and
g iving us th e cho ice to respo nd po siti vely to GoJ o r to reject th is g race and beco me
yet worse. O n thi s vicw, ir is stiLl th e case th at any goodn ess rem ai ning in h UIl1a n
beings is d ue to the
pre venien t grace of God; it is ju st pre.fcrJ'{'r/ g oodn ess.

no t restorerl goodness. I find it implausible that the fi rst sin of the Fall wou ld resulr
in total d eprav ity.
.11

Co ll ins, 70-82.

Collin s seems to con trad ic t implic itl y his own view on the irresistibility of
initial prevenient g race in a footno te, in w hich he deni es th at God eve r disp lays
"deterministic actjvity" w hen he works Illo nergisticall y, incl udi ng in prevenient g ran :.
15

Sec Collin s, 79; 350 n197 It is more accurate, I think, to describe God's monergistic
\vo rk in preven ie nt g race as uni lateral rathe r than irresistib le/deter m ini stic
,(, O f course, o ur \v ills may be actively e ngaged in sin w he n G od draws us w ith
prevenient g race, but the po int is that this grace continues to wo rk even \v he n \ve
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are not performing any posjrive work \vith n:spcct to our sa lvation .
37

In iny view, it is when we respo nd positively to prevenient grace that it

beeollleJ ju,tifying and " nctifying grace. Seemingly discrete categories of grace often
bleed in to one another in practice.
3H

Collins, 80-82.

'" Ibid., 15, 160-165; 203-205; 292.
4D

Ibid., 82; 160-161; 203; 29 1-292.

41

In fac t, the am biguity goe, deeper in We,ley,", he i, somewhat unclear as to

whether conversio n is resistible or irresistib le. See ,ferIlIOIlJ, 6:2HO-289;

Lelte1:lj

/-!.'.fJqyJ,

DialogsalldAddresses, 10:363; 10:230-231; 10:309. Collins picks up on this ambiguity
in Wesley's thought in his earlier work, The Senptllre If:7ery of SahJatioll (Nashville:
Abingdo n press, 1997),98-99 As we mentioned, Collins is clear in his most recent
work that he views justification / regeneration (conversion) as resistible. Evidently,
Collins believes that the maUlte Wesley moved beyond the irresistibility o f converting
grace, at least in most cases.
42

Letters, En'!ys, Dialogs and Addresses, 10:230.

43

Ibid., 10:209.

Wes ley clea rly has a libertarian (I\rminian) view of freedom . Thus, for him
a free act is an undeterm ined act. See Letters, Esserys, Dialogs and Addrenes, 10:468469 . Calvini sts do not deny that we repent and exercise faith, but they hold that
such actions are determined by God, and repentance and faith are typicalJy see n as
44

fo llowing regeneration rather than preceding it. But how can Calv inists consisten tl y

ho ld that God is the o nly actor / agent in salvation from start to fi n ish (total
monergism), as they generally do, while also ho ld ing tha t human beings have any
real kind of agency, as they generall y wa nt to do' Wha t thi s reveals, I thin k, is that
Calvinists often unwittingly display libertarian in tuitions with respect to human
agency; without explicitly affirming it, Calvinists implicitly fi nd compatibilism to
be insufficient to underwrite genu ine human agency.
45

Collins, 15 .

•1(,

Ibid. , 162- 163; 204.

47

Ibid., 15.

48

Ibid., 15, 163.

'" What is crucia l here i, that the mil cea,e, all exertion and activity. The body
natu rall y will still display activity, tho ugh in an involllntar), way, whether we are talki ng
abo ut surrendering to an operation or surrendering to the grace of God.
50 Wesley seems to h old that God can bring about entire sancti fication (and
presumab ly conversion) whenever the Lord pleases, it being a species of divine
freedom and sovereignty. I ndeed, in a key passage, Wesley seems to be affirming
that it is only conditionally necessar y that we do works do p repare to receive entirely
sanctifying grace. See Collins
Two things need to be said about this. At
the very least, as Wesley (and Collins) affirms, faith is absolutely nece"ary to receive
the gifts of God. If we refuse to meet this condition, then God cannot grant us
these graces without overriding our personhood. Secondly, mo", if not all persons
require time and opportunity to arrive at the state of spiritual receptivity required
to receive free ly en tirely sanctifying grace. It is precisely our pride that must be
overcome before God can convey entirely sanctifyi ng grace in a way that respects
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ou r personh ood. So wh ile I affirm wit:h Wesley and Co llin s that the suteriu lugic .1
timerable is surely in the hands and guidance of the Sovereign T,ord , it is not just the wi ll
uf G od thal is a factor here, but also the will uf man. Most if not all people require time
and opportuniry before they are prepared to receive entirely sanctifying grace.
5! Sermons 2:53 . Of course, we do have to freely receive these g races throug h
an act o f faith. While such acts of surrend er themselves surely are almo st pass ive,
it often takes a great amount o f mo ral effort- strenuous cooperation with C od 's

g race-to o vercome o ne's pride in order to be wil li ng to perfo rm alnlost passive acts

o f surrender to God.
52 Collins seems to assume that the work o f God alo ne and receiving g race
always email a q uali tative or instantaneous (crucial) change in Wes ley's thought, but
I do not believe he has defended thi s entailment. See Co lli ns 14-15. In my read ing
of Wes ley, God works alone at various points thro ugho ut o ur Ch ri stian walk and

the process o f sanctificatio n, not just at crucial mo ments o f g race sll ch justification /

regeneration and entire sanctificatio n. T his mean s that there is " receiving g race" in
Wesley's thought beyond qualitative or instantaneous works of grace. fu r an examp le
of this, see S erJllollS 1:226. In o ther words, I think God can and does wo rk alo ne o n
us ill in cremenral degrees (\v ith us receiving thi s work o ver tinl e throug h almo st

pass ive acts of faith) o n Wesley'S view, as well as in sta ntan eously and lJ uali ta hvel y
(such as in jusl'ifi cal'ion / regenerarion and en tire sanctifi carion).
33

N o te th at the iss ue here is logica l co nsistenc y and proper use o f theolog ica l

language. W hile 1 certain ly affirm that there is plen ty o f roo m for mys tery, paradox,
and tension in theo logy in their p roper place, we ought to pu sh logic and cl ari ty as
far as they can go before appeali ng ro such notions, and we certainly should no t be
comfortab le with logical con tradictio ns. T he point of a soteriological model, afte r
all , is to exp lain, not to ob scure.
54 A s Co lli ns righ tly points out, Wesley does use parall el language when
describing justific atio n / regeneration and entire sanctifi catio n, implying that G od
works in comparatively instantaneo us/quali tative ways in both. See Coll in s 287288. I n my own view (distinct fro m Wesley's) , entire sanctifica tio n is just the

co mp letio n of th e process o f sann ific(lrion (whi ch includ es bo th rece iv ing and

respond ing grace along the way) . O n this view, entire sanctifi cation is sri ll a thresho ld
change o f so rts: it issues in a qualitatively di sti nct kind o f li fe (a life without the
drag of original sin) as we ll as a quantitative change (l ess sinfulness than before,
namely, none) .
55 Although J do no t endorse tb e en tirety o f his analysis and concl usio ns, my
analysis regarding freedom and grace here is indeb ted to Kevin Timpe's " G race
and Controlling Wh at We D o N ot Cause" in Faith alld PbiloJophy 24, no. 3 (2007) .
Sf,

Note that nothing here undern1ines Wesley's qui te Re fo rm ed view of

justi fica tion, in whi ch the forgiveness of sins is based solely on the work and merits
of Christ a/one. T he fac t that we m ust perfo rm a synergistic work to reeein th is
grace does not change the basis o r grolllld of justi fica ti on . O ur act o f fai th is the
" for mal ca use" (condition) of our receiving justifi catio n, but God's work in Christ
alone remai ns the meri torious cause of justificatio n. See Colli ns, 107; 169 -181.
57 T hank s to Ke nn eth .J. Collin s, Jerr y L. Wa ll s, D avid Baggett, Phil ip Ta ll on ,
Adam Blincoe, Jeremy Buchanan, and (last bu t certainly fl ot least) my wife, Courtney
Blanchette, for helpfu l cri ticisms and cl ari fyi ng com ments o n earl ier d rafts o f thi s
paper. T hanks to J\ dam Blinco e fo r challenging so me o f my forme r theo logical
thinki ng on this to pic and in spiring some of the insigh ts of this paper.

